Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts (2024)

State of Tennessee v. James Ray Bartlett - Order
M2001-02419-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley

Defendant appeals the circuit court judgments denying him probation on two misdemeanor counts of passing worthless checks. We affirm pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

M2001-01616-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant real estate developer developed a golf club. The plaintiff insurance broker entered into an insurance binder with the manager of the golf club. The "master" binder covered five separate properties with which the manager was involved. The binder listed another of the manager's entities as the insured. The manager was later terminated by the defendant and a new management company was hired to manage the golf club. The insurance broker then issued a separate policy naming the defendant as the insured and sent invoices for the unpaid premiums to the new management company. The management company declined to pay the premiums. The insurance broker then filed suit against the defendant. The trial court entered a judgment for the insurance broker for all unpaid premiums due under the insurance binder, plus interest. We affirm, finding that manager had the apparent authority to enter into an insurance contract and that there was a contract for insurance between the parties.

Vernessa Ekelem vs. Ifeatu Ekelem
W2001-02986-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
This is a divorce case. Both parties are physicians. Both have children from previous marriages, and they have three children together. The parties' three children were minors at the time of the divorce hearing. The father earned substantial income in 1996, which fell precipitously when he started his own medical practice in 1998. His medical practice, however, owns luxury vehicles, and the father owns a large home with significant acreage. The trial court found the father's earning capacity to be at the level of the mother's income, set child support based on that earning capacity, and established the father's parenting time with the parties' children. The father was ordered to assume the parties' tax debt, and to cease making derogatory remarks about the mother. On appeal, the father argues that the trial court erred in setting child support, in setting parenting time, in assigning the tax liability to him, and in enjoining him from making derogatory comments about the mother. We affirm as modified, and remand, awarding the mother attorney's fees for this appeal.

Daniel Goodwin vs. John Dunlap
W2002-00014-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a legal malpractice action originally filed by individual plaintiff and a corporation. The individual plaintiff was acting pro se for himself and also for the corporation. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant based upon his affidavit that he complied with the standard of care representing the corporate plaintiff, that he had no attorney/client relationship with the individual plaintiff. No countervailing affidavit concerning the standard of care was filed by the plaintiffs and the dismissal of the corporation's case was also premised on the rule that a corporation cannot act pro se by a nonlawyer agent. Individual plaintiff's affidavit does not specifically refute defendant's affidavit concerning no attorney-client relationship between the individual plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Felicia Webb vs. Ernest Gillespie
W2001-02828-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Howard W. Horne

W2001-02886-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
This is a will construction case. The husband devised a life estate in land to his wife, and at her death, to his devisees. The husband devised other land in fee simple to his wife, and gave her the rest and residue of his estate. The husband died in 1954 and the wife died in 1998. The remaindermen under the husband's will argued that certain real property was included in the wife's life estate and, thus, at her death, devolved to them. The beneficiaries of the wife's will argued that the real property in question was not included in the life estate or mentioned in the husband's will, and thus the land went to the wife in fee simple by operation of the residue clause in the husband's will and should now devolve to them. The trial court found that the husband intended to include the land in question in the life estate to the wife. Therefore, the land devolved to the husband's devisees. The beneficiaries of the wife's estate appeal. We affirm.

Felicia Webb vs. Ernest Gillespie
W2001-02828-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Harold W. Horne

Dagmar Moss vs. Alvin Moss
W2001-02809-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
Wife filed a complaint for divorce alleging inappropriate marital conduct and, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences, and husband filed a counterclaim for divorce on the same grounds. The chancery court awarded the wife an absolute divorce and alimony in solido in the amount of $1,000.00, to be paid toward her attorney fees, but denied wife's claim for alimony in futuro. Wife appeals. We affirm as modified and remand.

Norman Hamby vs. State
W2002-00928-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
This is a premises liability case arising from Plaintiff's fall into a ventilation pit on the University of Tennessee at Memphis (referred to herein as UT) campus when an aluminum grate covering the opening collapsed while Plaintiff was standing on it. The Commissioner of Claims of the Western Division held that the accident was not foreseeable and that UT did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the grating over the pit. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand.

Connie Pugh vs. Poplar Apartments
W2001-02050-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
This case involves allegations of unlawful ouster. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the defendant landlord. We affirm.

Christian Yeubanks vs. Methodist LeBonheur
W2001-02051-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a procedurally complex medical malpractice case. A child was injured in a car accident. She was taken by helicopter to the hospital, where she died. The child's mother filed suit, alleging liability on the part of three physicians, and vicarious liability on the part of the hospital for the actions of the three physicians. She also asserted that the second physician's medical group was liable for that physician's actions. The complaint was later amended to include independent allegations of liability against the hospital. The mother voluntarily dismissed the claims against the first physician; however, the claim of liability against the hospital for the actions of the first physician remained. Immediately before the trial, the mother asserted that the hospital was liable for the actions of a fourth physician. The trial court ruled that evidence regarding a claim against the fourth physician was not admissible. Near the close of her proof, the mother voluntarily dismissed her claims against the second physician and his medical group. At the conclusion of the mother's proof, the trial court granted motions for directed verdict for the claims based on the independent actions of the hospital and for the claims against the hospital based on the actions of the first physician. The trial court then denied a motion for directed verdict on the claim of vicarious liability against the hospital for the actions of the third physician. The trial court then heard a motion to strike testimony related to claims against the third physician. Prior to a ruling on the motion, the mother voluntarily dismissed the claims against the third physician and against the hospital based on the actions of the third physician. The trial court awarded costs against the mother and ordered that, prior to refiling her case, the mother would be required to pay the costs. The mother appeals, arguing that consideration of the motions for directed verdict was premature, that the trial court's decision is not final and appealable, that the trial court improperly excluded evidence on claims that the hospital was liable for the actions of the fourth physician, that the trial court erred in granting the motion for directed verdict for the independent claims of negligence against the hospital, and that the trial court erred in awarding costs against the mother and in requiring her to pay those costs prior to refiling her case. We reverse the portion of the trial court's decision requiring the mother to pay the awarded costs prior to refiling her case. The remainder of the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

W2002-00136-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
This is a sales/UCC case. A landscaper contracted to purchase a used piece of machinery, an excavator, from an equipment company. The excavator had a defective hydraulic system. Under the terms of the sales contract, the equipment company was to repair the defective hydraulic system. The equipment company attempted to do so and delivered the excavator to the landscaper. The hydraulic system, however, did not work properly and the equipment company was unable to repair the excavator to the landscaper's satisfaction. The landscaper then had the excavator repaired by a third party. The landscaper sued the equipment company for failure to satisfy a condition precedent to the contract, and for breach of contract. The trial court awarded actual damages for the difference in value between the excavator bargained for and the excavator actually received, as well as consequential damages. The equipment company appeals. We modify the actual damages to the cost to repair the excavator, and we reverse the award of consequential damages, finding that the proof of consequential damages was too speculative to support such an award.

Sheri English vs. Chris Pretti
W2001-01657-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to the Plaintiffs' uninsured motorist insurance carrier, finding that the carrier's liability was offset by the workers' compensation award which the Plaintiff received for her injuries. We affirm.

In Matter of R.C.V. and O.V.
W2001-02102-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George E. Blancett
This is a termination of parental rights case on appeal for the second time. This Court in the first appeal reversed the order of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of the parties primarily because the trial court failed to provide counsel to the parties pursuant to Rule 39, Tenn. R. Juv. P. On remand, the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence justifying termination of parental rights pursuant to the applicable statutes and that termination was in the children's best interests. The juvenile court also held that the appointment of a special judge in this instance was not unconstitutional nor was the parent denied due process in the termination proceeding. As appealed, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Allen Prentice Blye
E2001-01227-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck
The Defendant, Allen Prentice Blye, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary and aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years for the aggravated burglary, and as a Range II, violent offender to forty years for the aggravated rape. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction, for an effective sentence of fifty-five years. The Defendant now appeals as of right, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence; erred in admitting certain testimony at trial concerning DNA evidence; that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him the services of a psychological expert for sentencing purposes; and that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors in setting the length of his sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Allen Prentice Blye - Concurring
E2001-01227-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck
I write separately to express my concern over utilizing the ex parte search warrant process rather than an adversarial hearing to secure a blood sample from a defendant after adversarial proceedings have begun where there are no exigent circ*mstances. To my knowledge, this issue has not been addressed by our state supreme court.

State of Tennessee v. James A. Mellon
E1999-01505-CCA-R3-DD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

The defendant, James A. Mellon, pled guilty to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and waived his right to a trial by jury. As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend concurrent sentences on these charges of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole and twenty-five years imprisonment, respectively, in exchange for the defendant's agreement to testify truthfully and consistent with his previous statement at the trials of his codefendants. Thereafter, the defendant refused to testify as required by his plea agreement, instead, moving to withdraw his guilty pleas. That motion was denied, the State withdrew its sentencing recommendation, and a sentencing hearing was held. The jury, at the sentencing hearing, found the statutory aggravating circ*mstance that the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving violence to the person and sentenced the defendant to death. For the conviction of especially aggravated robbery, the defendant was sentenced to a consecutive term of twenty-five years imprisonment. He then filed a timely appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the imposition of the death penalty.

Estate of James Sanderson
W2001-01938-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
This case concerns the administration of an estate. The decedent's widow appeals the trial court's judgment claiming that it was error to deny her claim for an elective share of the estate. Appellant also alleges error in the finding that the administrator had not caused the estate to suffer monetary loss as a result of actions taken by him in his role as administrator. We affirm.

Larry Bullock vs. Charles Spell
W2002-00053-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This appeal arises from a contract dispute. The trial court, finding that Mr. Bullock had substantially complied with the contract provisions and that he did not repudiate the contract, entered judgment in his favor. The court awarded damages based on breach of contract, including attorney fees and additional damages. The parties raise multiple issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Rodney Williams
W2001-02606-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

The defendant, Rodney Williams, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court conviction for aggravated robbery. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and insists that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the victim's pretrial and in-court identification. We affirm.

Town of Collierville vs. Norfolk Railway
W2001-02391-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
This is a condemnation case on appeal for the second time. At three places at which roads were to cross over an existing railroad track, the town filed a petition to condemn property in which the railroad owned a right-of-way, in order to build railroad crossings. The trial court initially found that the railroad could not challenge the town's right to take the property and granted the town's motion for the writs of possession. The railroad appealed for the first time. In the first appeal, this Court reversed the trial court and found that the railroad was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the railroad crossings would materially impair or interfere with the railroad's prior use of the rights-of-way. On remand, the trial court found that they would not, thus concluding that the town had the right to condemn the property. The trial court then considered the damages for the condemnation. The railroad sought incidental damages related to its depreciation costs, as well as costs for its increased exposure to liability because of the additional crossings. The trial court determined that the railroad, as a matter of law, could not recover depreciation costs, and also held that the railroad failed to produce proof to support an award of damages for increased liability exposure. The railroad appeals. We affirm, finding that the railroad can recover neither depreciation costs nor damages for increased exposure to liability from the additional crossings.

State of Tennessee v. Stacey Renee Moore
E2001-01905-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp
The appellant, Stacey Renee Moore, entered guilty pleas to two counts of theft over five hundred dollars ($500), Class E felonies; one count of theft under five hundred dollars ($500), a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony. For each felony conviction, the appellant received a one-year sentence, with the sentences to be served consecutively. Additionally, the appellant received an eleven month and twenty-nine day sentence for the misdemeanor conviction to be served concurrent to the felony convictions. The trial court denied the appellant's request for alternative sentencing and sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

CH-01-1148-3
CH-01-1148-3
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

CH-01-0462-2;
CH-01-0462-2;
Trial Court Judge: Kenny W. Armstrong

James Edwards vs. Banco Lumber
E2002-01038-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley
James and Margaret Edwards ("Plaintiffs") sued Banco Lumber Company Inc., ("Banco") claiming Banco had trespassed on their property and removed timber. Banco filed a third-party complaint against Nathan Byrd, Betty Byrd, Fred Byrd, and Barbara Byrd (the "Byrds") for indemnification relying on a Timber Deed and Contract between Banco and the Byrds. Plaintiffs nonsuited their action against Banco and an Order was entered on May 16, 2000, dismissing only Plaintiffs' action. Apparently realizing this was not a final order, the Trial Court entered a "Final Order" three days later which disposed of not only Plaintiffs' claims but also Banco's third-party complaint against the Byrds. Plaintiffs re-filed their lawsuit against Banco one year and two days after the first order was entered, but less than a year after the "Final Order" was entered. Plaintiffs also sued the Byrds, for the first time, in this second complaint. The Trial Court held the entry date of the first Order should be used when determining whether the second complaint had been re-filed within the one-year time period under the "Saving Statute." The Trial Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against Banco and the Byrds holding the statute of limitations had run. We vacate in part and affirm in part.